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With the Phase 4 cancellation provision, the cumulative emissions cap of the EU ETS has
become dependent on the amount of surplus allowances and future emissions abatement
costs. In this paper, we discuss how the design of the market stability reserve greatly
increases uncertainty over cumulative emissions and implies that there will be more
cancellation when future abatement is more costly, making the policy more stringent
when the cost of compliance is higher. Moreover, we illustrate how overlapping policies
may lead to paradoxical effects on cumulative emissions.
Key policy insights:
• The cancellation policy of the market stability reserve may puncture the waterbed
of the European Emission Trading System for decades, which results in significant
uncertainty on the cumulative emissions.
• A counter-intuitive, self-reinforcing relation between the future cost of abatement
and the cancellation volume makes this policy more stringent when it is more costly
to meet.
• Depending on how overlapping policies affect the waterbed puncture and future
abatement costs, they may trigger paradoxical cumulative emission reductions or
increases.
Keywords: European Emission Trading System, Market Stability Reserve, Cancellation,
Waterbed, Marginal Abatement Cost
To bring its greenhouse gas emission abatement targets in line with the Paris Agreement, the EU
strengthened the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) by adding a cancellation
policy to its market stability reserve (MSR) (European Union, 2018). If the number of allowances in
circulation surpasses a fixed threshold, the MSR absorbs a share of the allowances to be auctioned, so
that they can be released again from the reserve in the future. Starting in 2023, however, a cancellation
policy will be in effect, such that allowances held in the MSR exceeding the amount auctioned during
the previous year will be canceled (European Union, 2018). In this comment, we shed light on two
important unintended consequences of the cancellation policy: the high uncertainty on the effective
cumulative emissions cap and the counterintuitive relation between the future cost of abatement and
cancellation volumes.
Without the cancellation policy, individual actions to reduce emissions only affect who emits and at
what price, but not what ultimately matters, which is how much is emitted in total under the fixed
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cap – the so-called waterbed effect (described using the analogy of a waterbed because you can push
down on a waterbed in any location, but the total volume of water in the bed remains the same).
However, with a cancellation policy in effect, actions to reduce emissions, such as other overlapping
policies (Bertram et al., 2015; Perino, 2018; Perino et al., 2019; Rosendahl, 2019b) or strategies to
buy, bank, and burn allowances (Gerlagh and Heijmans, 2019), may result in changes to cumulative
emissions – puncturing the waterbed.
Perino (2018) correctly points out that the effect of additional actions to reduce emissions on the
effective emissions cap depends on past and future emissions, which determine how long the waterbed
will be punctured. In this contribution, however, we show that there is a more general phenomenon
going on as well: the surplus of allowances, and thus the degree of cancellation and duration of the
waterbed puncture, depends on the market’s expectation of future emissions abatement costs. For
example, if firms expect higher abatement costs in the future, they would likely choose to abate
more today and bank the surplus allowances for future use. But because of the cancellation policy, if
more allowances are banked today, more will be cancelled, and the cumulative emissions reductions
would be greater. In contrast, if firms expect future abatement costs to be low, e.g., because of
technological learning (Creutzig et al., 2017), they would likely choose to postpone abatement and
bank fewer allowances. With fewer banked allowances, fewer would be cancelled, and cumulative
emissions reductions would be lower (Rosendahl, 2019b).
Thus, the cumulative emissions under the EU ETS with a cancellation policy will depend in an
important way on market’s expectations about future emissions abatement costs. This insight can
have considerable ramifications for the effects of the EU ETS cancellation policy, especially because
future marginal abatement costs are highly uncertain (Borenstein et al., 2019). To explore this,
we perform a set of simulations to more profoundly expose how uncertainty about future marginal
abatement costs can affect the overall stringency of the EU ETS with the current cancellation policy.
Ramifications of Abatement Cost Uncertainty
We examine uncertainty over the marginal abatement costs (MAC) under the EU ETS over time by
varying the annual growth rate of baseline emissions, the slope capturing how marginal abatement
costs rise with increased emissions reductions and the curvature of the MAC curve. We solve our EU
ETS model, which assumes current policies remain in place until the end of our horizon, leveraging an
iterative price-search algorithm (Bruninx et al., 2019). In each simulation, we impose recorded emission
levels in 2017-2018 and calibrate the slope of the MAC curve such that the emission allowance price
in 2018 equals the average price observed after the adoption of the strengthened MSR (20.7 e/tCO2).
For more information on the methodology, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
Figure 1 summarizes the results of our analysis. The left-hand panel shows that, in our simulations,
cumulative emissions in the period 2017-2062 could be as high as 41.4 GtCO2 or as low as 28.0 GtCO2,
depending on ratio between the MAC today (approximated as the MAC in 2018, calculated at recorded
emission levels) and in the future (approximated as the MAC in 2050, calculated at expected emission
levels). These simulation results show that for every tenfold increase in the ratio of today’s and future
MAC, cumulative emissions decrease by 4.9 GtCO2 and prolong the puncture in the waterbed by 12
years. The relative difference between today’s and future MAC increases with the curvature of the
MAC curve, increasing baseline emissions and lower technological learning rates.
These trends are confirmed in both a simple analytical two-period model of emissions abatement
and banking with cancellation (see Appendix) and a detailed modeling exercise of the European-wide
long-term abatement cost function (Bruninx et al., 2019). For a more extensive discussion of the
methodology and discussion of the results, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
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Figure 1. Cumulative CO2 emissions, cancellation volumes and year in which the water bed is sealed as a function of the
ratio between future and present marginal abatement costs (MAC) for a wide range of parameter settings of the MAC
curve. The dots correspond to simulation results, whereas the dashed lines visualize a fitted trend line. Future marginal
abatement costs are approximated as the marginal abatement cost in 2050 given emission levels in that year. The MAC
in 2018 is calculated at historical emission levels. Additional anchor points include the estimates by Perino and Willner
(2017) and Bruninx et al. (2019) and the cumulative emissions cap over the period 2017-2060.
Implications for Policy
Our results illustrate two key points that have not been fully recognized in the academic literature
nor the policy debate. First, because the markets’ perception of present and future costs of abatement
constantly changes, the allowance cancellation rules generate substantial uncertainty in the cumulative
emissions reductions from the EU ETS. In our simulations, allowance cancellation ranges from 2 to 16
GtCO2, and the waterbed may be punctured (allowing for additional emissions reductions) anywhere
from 3 to 33 years. We posit that this combined uncertainty in what the cumulative cap actually will
be and the future marginal abatement costs may generate further allowance price volatility.
Second, our simulations reveal that the cancellation rules imply that there will be more cancellation
of allowances when the market expects future abatement costs to be higher (e.g., due to growth of
baseline emissions, low rate of technological learning or higher curvature and slope of the MAC curve).
This implies that there now is a built-in mechanism in EU ETS that has the perverse incentive that
when it is more expensive to abate, the policy is more stringent. This unintended self-reinforcing effect
would serve to increase the costs of the policy, and possibly increase allowance prices above values that
are justifiable. Interestingly, the same reinforcing effect exists between the emissions cap trajectory
and cancellation. We find that cumulative emissions decrease more than proportionally when the rate
at which the annual emissions cap decreases (i.e., the linear reduction factor), increases, because a
faster decreasing emissions cap increases the future cost of abatement.
Interaction with Overlapping Policies
The described reinforcing effect of the cancellation policy also has important consequences for overlap-
ping policies (Perino, 2018; Perino et al., 2019; Rosendahl, 2019b), such as energy efficiency measures,
additional national carbon taxes, or targets and support for renewable energy sources. By changing
the future cost of abatement and the duration of the waterbed puncture, these policies themselves
may counter-intuitively affect the cancellation volumes. To illustrate this interaction, we simulate the
effectiveness of overlapping policies that reduce or increase CO2 emissions or the supply of allowances
by 1, 10 or 100 MtCO2 in 2019, 2050 or in every year of the studied period (2019-2060). The slope
and curvature of the MAC curve is unaffected by the overlapping policy. Baseline emission growth or
technological learning is not considered in these simulations.
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Figure 2. The impact of various overlapping policies that reduce or increase emissions or the supply of allowances by
1, 10 or 100 MtCO2 in 2019, 2050 or the period 2019-2060. The effectiveness of the overlapping policy is defined as
the effective cumulative emission reduction relative to the emissions targeted by the policy directly. As a reference, the
impact of these policies in absence of the MSR are indicated by the solid, black lines. The arrows indicate how the
effectiveness changes with an increasing ratio of future and current marginal abatement costs.
Figure 2 summarizes the results of our numerical analysis. Although the ratio of future and current
MAC remains the most important determinant of the cumulative emissions and the year in which
the waterbed puncture is sealed, we here focus on the effectiveness of the overlapping policies. The
effectiveness is defined as the effective cumulative emission reduction relative to the volume of emissions
targeted by the policy directly. Consequently, a policy that reduces emissions by 1 MtCO2 should
ideally have an effectiveness of 1, whereas a policy that increases the supply of allowances by 1 MtCO2
should have an effectiveness of -1. Note that all results can be checked analytically changing E1, E2,
q1 and q2 in Equation (13).
The upper-left panel shows the effect of reducing EU ETS CO2 emissions, e.g., triggered by energy
efficiency investments, targets on renewable electricity generation, a coal phase-out or support for
renewables. When we assume that policies reducing CO2 emissions today have no effect on the duration
of the waterbed puncture, their effectiveness will always be below one, because every year only 24%
(before 2023) or 12% (after 2023) of the additional surplus is absorbed and cancelled (Perino, 2018).
The longer the duration of the puncture, the closer the effectiveness will be to one.1 On the contrary,
when CO2 reductions are announced now but only come into effect after the waterbed is sealed again,
they will have a negative effect on total emissions. As pointed out by Rosendahl (2019b), future CO2
1In theory, the reduction of CO2 emissions today may prolong the duration of the punctured waterbed, which would
result in the effectiveness of CO2-reducing policies today to exceed one. However, the odds of this happening are low
because only a small fraction of additional surplus is still available when the puncture would be sealed again.
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emission reductions will lower the future price of allowances, decreasing surplus before the waterbed
is sealed by making banking less profitable and, hence, reduce cancellation volumes. Similarly, when
this decreases the duration of the puncture, the effectiveness will be below minus one. When the
abatement effort is permanent, the net effect on cumulative emissions is low but positive.2 Permanent
abatement efforts may affect the duration of the waterbed puncture, but this does not increase the
effectiveness of the policy above one in any of our simulations.
The bottom-left panel shows the effect of increasing EU ETS CO2 emissions, e.g. because of a nuclear
phase-out, a tax on non-ETS emissions or the electrification of transportation or heating. Similar
effects occur, but the relation between the timing of the abatement efforts and the effectiveness is
inverted. Cumulative emissions increase (negative effectiveness) when emissions increase now, while
they decrease (positive effectiveness) when emissions are announced to increase in the future. In-
creasing CO2 emissions today may seal the waterbed sooner, which results in an effectiveness below
minus one.3 Permanent increases in emissions, triggered by, e.g., electrification or a nuclear phase-out,
result in small, negative effectiveness values. On the contrary, increases in emissions in the far future
announced today increase the cost of meeting the cap, hence, provide incentives to bank allowances,
which increases cancellation volumes. As a result, announced increases in future baseline emissions
never trigger increase in cumulative emissions – such actions may even prolong the duration of the
waterbed puncture, hence, reach an effectiveness exceeding one.
In each case, a higher ratio of the future and current marginal abatement costs reinforces the positive or
negative effect of a policy (arrows in Fig. 2). Indeed, the effects described above are relevant during
the period that the waterbed is punctured, which increases with this cost ratio (Fig. 1). Larger
changes in baseline emissions or the supply of allowances are more likely to change the duration of the
waterbed puncture, which reinforces the effect described above.
The panels on the right show the effectiveness of policies that change the supply of allowances, e.g.,
because of voluntary cancellations or changes to the EU ETS emissions profile (Gerlagh and Heijmans,
2019). The effectiveness of such policies ǫ(·) is very similar to that of policies acting on baseline
emissions and can be related as:
ǫ(reducing supply) ≈ ǫ(increasing emissions) + 1
ǫ(increasing supply) ≈ ǫ(reducing emissions)− 1
The impact of increasing or decreasing the surplus today or in the future on the MSR’s actions does
not depend on whether it is caused by changing emissions or the supply of allowances. However,
policies increasing or decreasing supply will increase or decrease cumulative emissions by the amount
specified by the policy, on top of which one needs to account for the effects described above.
Mitigating the unintended consequences
There are several possibilities to ameliorate these outcomes. Most simply, the cancellation policy could
be removed and the EU ETS could be tightened rather than have countries implement overlapping
policies. For example, a one-time, lump-sum cancellation policy could be used to remove the current
surplus of allowances and decrease emissions by the same amount. Alternatively, further increasing the
rate at which the annual emissions cap decreases would bring the cap in line with emissions. Another
proposal that could help would be a price-based MSR (Borenstein et al., 2019), which would avoid
emission allowance price volatility.
2Rosendahl (2019a) reports a negative effectiveness for permanent abatement efforts – a finding we were unable to
reproduce in this study.
3Compared to the effect described in footnote 1, it is more likely that the waterbed is sealed sooner when CO2
emissions would increase today, especially when the puncture would be sealed shortly after 2023.
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Appendix
Decision problem of a representative firm under the EU ETS & MSR
In equilibrium, the representative firm abates until its marginal abatement cost (MAC) equals the
emission allowance price (Perino and Willner, 2017). Hence, given an emission allowance price path,
the representative firm’s emissions are know (Eq. (3)) and the firm minimizes the procurement cost
of the required emission allowances to cover these emissions, assuming a discount rate r:
Min.
∑
t∈T
pt · q˜t
(1 + r)t
(1)
subject to
∀t ∈ T :
t∑
t∗=1
q˜t∗ ≥
t∑
t∗=1
qt∗ (2)
∀t ∈ T : qt = F
−1
t (pt) (3)
∀t ∈ T : q˜t, qt ≥ 0 (4)
The representative firm must buy sufficient allowances q˜t ahead of time to cover its emissions qt (Eq.
(2)). Note that Eq. (2) implies that the representative firm may bank allowances, but that borrowing
is not allowed. Equation (3) relates the emissions qt to the emission allowance price pt via the marginal
abatement cost curve (MACC) Ft(pt). In this contribution, we consider the following functional form
for the MACC:
∀t∈T : pt = βt · (Et − qt)
γ (5)
Emissions qt are restricted to positive values and limited to 2017-levels. The functional form of the
MACC is defined by baseline emissions Et, a slope βt and a curvature γ. Higher baseline emissions
increase the abatement needed to meet the emissions trajectory, while higher values of βt and γ
increase the marginal cost of abatement. If γ > 1, the MACC is convex, meaning that the cost of
additional abatement increases more than proportionally.
The constraint which enforces the balance between the demand for and supply of emission allowances,
and hence, links the decisions of all firms, can be expressed as follows:
∀t∈T : qt − q˜t ≥ 0 (pt) (6)
The dual variable associated with this constraint pt may be interpreted as the emission allowance price
that ensures that the representative firm’s strategy coincides with its long-run equilibrium strategy. In
other words, presented with these prices, the representative firm does not have an incentive to change
its strategy. Note that the supply of allowances qt is the net supply of emission allowances, corrected
for the actions of the MSR.
This model is, in fact, similar to the one employed by Perino and Willner (2017). However, our
solution strategy allows, i.a., for non-linear MACCs, as discussed below.
Numerical solution strategy
To determine the equilibrium ETS price over the studied period (2018-2062) which ensures that the
supply of and demand for allowances is balanced (Eq. (6)), we leverage an iterative price-search
algorithm, based on ADMM, as introduced by Bruninx et al. (2019). In each iteration, the algorithm
proposes a new emission allowance price pt for each considered year, depending on the imbalance
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between the allowances requested by the firms q˜t and the net supply of allowances qt. Furthermore,
the MSR actions are imposed in each price update step, i.e., in each iteration, the total number of
allowances in circulation is calculated. This metric governs the intake and outflow of allowances in the
MSR, whereas cancellation volumes are determined by the foreseen auction volumes in the preceding
year. For details, see Bruninx et al. (2019).
After each update of the price and net supply of emission allowances, the representative firm re-
optimizes its decisions. If the emission allowance price, MSR actions, hence, net supply of emission
allowances, and the representative firm’s strategy no longer change between iterations, we accept the
solution as an equilibrium solution.
By adopting this solution strategy, one effectively parameterizes the decision problem of the represen-
tative firm in the emission allowance price, which in turn is a function of the net supply and MSR
actions. Consequently, the emissions of the representative firm may be calculated ex-ante and the
representative firm’s decision problem becomes a linear programming problem, which can be solved
efficiently using off-the-shelf solvers. For details on the adopted solution strategy and its convergence,
the interested reader is referred to Bruninx et al. (2019).
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Figure 3. Marginal abatement cost curves for the year 2018 for MAC curvatures (γ) between 1 and 4. The solid lines
indicate the cases without technological learning and growth of baseline emissions. The dashed lines visualize the impact
of increasing baseline emissions (“Et +1%/y”, no technological learning) and technological learning (“β +1%/y”, no
growth in baseline emissions) for γ = 3.
Calibration of the MAC curve: assuming a wide parameter space
As the actual MAC curve is fundamentally uncertain (Borenstein et al., 2019), we vary all three
parameters of Eq. (5). First, baseline emissions in 2018 (E2018) are equal to 1.9 GtCO2, as in Perino
and Willner (2017), and may grow at a predetermined, annual growth rate between 0 and 1%. Second,
the curvature parameter γ is set to a discrete value between 1 and 4, indicating increasing curvature.
Third, β2018 is calibrated in each simulation individually such that the emission allowance price in
2018 approximates 20.7 e/tCO2, i.e., the average emission allowance price since the adoption of the
market stability reserve (EEX, Last accessed: August 1, 2019). The slope parameter βt decreases
with a predetermined, annual rate between 0 and 1%, reflecting the impact of, e.g., technological
learning on abatement costs. In some cases, this calibration effort results in very low MAC in 2018.
Therefore, we reject all MAC curves that imply a MAC in 2018 below 0.1e/tCO2, as they would lead
to unrealistic high abatement efforts in the near future in response to the MSR reform. For each set of
retained MAC parameters, we solve our EU ETS model leveraging the iterative price-search algorithm
described above (Bruninx et al., 2019), assuming a real discount rate of 8%. Figure 3 represents
marginal abatement cost curves for the year 2018 for MAC curvatures between 1 and 4.
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Detailed simulation results: the effect of baseline emissions, technological learning,
the slope and curvature of the MAC curve
Complementary to Figure 1 above, Figure 4 summarizes the same results of our analysis, but zooming
in on the separate effect of the three MAC parameters (baseline emissions, slope and curvature). This
figure represents cumulative emissions (left-hand panel) and the year in which the waterbed is sealed
again (right-hand panel), for the different assumed values of baseline emissions, technological learning
and MAC curvature. Overlapping policies are not considered.
First, the horizontal markers indicate the values without technological learning or growth of baseline
emissions. The left-hand panel shows that cumulative emissions until 2062 could be as high as 41.2
GtCO2 or as low as 28.0 GtCO2, depending on the convexity (γ) of the MAC curve (in abscence
of technological learning or baseline emission increases). If we expect high costs for higher levels of
emissions abatement (higher γ), we might abate more now and bank allowances for later use, such that
the increased surplus will trigger more cancellation. If we expect future abatement to be relatively
cheap (lower γ), we might abate less, which decreases the surplus and cancellation. Consequently, if
we expect a linear MAC curve (Perino and Willner, 2017; Perino, 2018), the right-hand panel shows
that the waterbed is again sealed by 2023, while the waterbed could be punctured until 2052 when
the MAC curve is highly convex.
Second, the values above the horizontal markers correspond to simulations in which technological
learning reduces the cost of future abatement (the upper value is characterized by an annual learning
rate of 1%). Since technological learning decreases the cost of future abatement compared to abatement
today, it leads to less banking, lower cancellation and higher cumulative emissions and seals the
waterbed sooner.
Third, the values below the horizontal markers indicate increasing baseline emissions (the bottom-most
value is characterized by an annual growth rate of 1%). Increasing baseline emissions inflates the cost
of future abatement efforts and thus triggers lower emissions today, a higher surplus and cancellation
volume, thus lower cumulative emissions. Similarly, it leads to more persistent punctures.
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Figure 4. Cumulative CO2 emissions, cancellation volumes and the year in which the waterbed is sealed (i.e., the year
in which the TNAC drops below 833 MtCO2) for γ-values between 1 and 4. The horizontal markers indicate the values
without technological learning or growth of baseline emissions. The vertical bars indicate the range of possible outcomes
for the parameter space described above. Technological learning leads to higher emissions, lower cancellation volumes
and a TNAC that drops earlier below 833 MtCO2 (values above the horizontal markers). In contrast, increasing baseline
emissions lead to lower emissions, higher cancellation volumes and a TNAC that stays longer above 833 MtCO2 (values
below the vertical markers). Additional anchor points include the estimates for the cancellation volume and the year
in which the waterbed is sealed by Perino and Willner (2017) and Bruninx et al. (2019) and the cumulative EU ETS
emissions cap over the period 2017-2062.
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Analytical solution of a stylized two-period model
For two-period cases, however, one may solve the model above analytically if one assumes the impact
of the MSR on the net supply of emission allowances is known. Consider the following explicit refor-
mulation, in which we introduce a new banking variable b:
Period 1:
cap with banking : q1 = q1 + b (7)
MACC : p1 = β1(E1 − q1)
γ (8)
Period 2:
cap with banking and cancellation : q2 + αb = q2 (9)
MACC : p2 = β2(E2 − q2)
γ (10)
price path : p2 = (1 + r)p1 (11)
In the model above, pt is allowance price in period t=1,2, qt the quantity emitted in period t and b
the number of allowances banked from period 1 to period 2, i.e., the difference between the emissions
and the procured allowances. We assume that b>0, i.e. no borrowing is allowed. As above, the
parameters βt, γ and baseline emissions Et determine the (non-persistent) MACC, r is the discount
rate between the two periods, qt is the emissions cap in period t, and α is the share of banked allowances
that is transferred to the next period. To account for technological learning, β1 may differ from β2
(β2 ≤ β1). The value of α decreases with the duration of the punctured waterbed, see Perino (2018),
and is assumed an exogenous parameter in this simplified, two-period model. The total number of
allowances cancelled is (1− α)b. All parameters are positive.
Solving the set of 5 equations and 5 unknowns leads to
p1 = β1
(
E2 − q2 + α(E1 − q1)
A+ α
)γ
with A =
((1 + r)β1
β2
) 1
γ > 1 if β1 ≥ β2 (12)
This shows that, as expected, the emission allowance prices are positive as long as the cumulative
emissions cap is below baseline emissions.
The price in period 1 decreases in the discount rate r, q1 and q2, and increases in baseline emissions
Et, βt (if β2 is proportional to β1) and γ (because β2 ≤ β1). This means that the price is higher when
abatement is more costly (β and γ higher). The effect of α depends on the parameter values. The
effect on the price in period 2 is the same, except that it increases in the discount rate r.
Cancellation equals:
(1− α)b =
1− α
A+ α
(
E2 − q2 −A(E1 − q1)
)
with A =
((1 + r)β1
β2
) 1
γ > 1 if (1 + r)β1 ≥ β2 (13)
It is straightforward to see that cancellation increases in q1, E2 and β1, and decreases in q2, E1, β2,
α and r. This means that cancellation increases faster if the emissions cap trajectory decreases faster
(q2 < q1) and the baseline emissions increase faster (E2 > E1). In addition, the more β2 is lower than
β1 (technological learning), the more cancellation decreases. Because β2 ≤ β1, cancellation increases
with γ.4 That is, cancellation is higher when abatement is more costly.
4This is still true as long as the slope of the MAC increases slower over time than the discount rate, i.e. β2 < β1(1+r).
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